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Butler: Should Radicals Be Judges?

SHOULD RADICALS BE JUDGES?
PaulButler*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Should people who seek fundamental changes in the United States'
political and economic systems become judges? I want to consider this
question from the perspective of those persons-whom I will call
"radicals"-and from ethics. The first issue requires an understanding of
legal radicalism, especially its analysis of judicial power. The radical
will want to be a judge only if it furthers her cause. The second
consideration-legal ethics-investigates whether there is a principled

reason to be wary of radical judges, as opposed to liberal or conservative
ones.
As a preliminary matter, it will be useful to clarify what I mean by
"radical." In law, radicalism is most closely associated with critical
theory, including critical legal theory, feminist jurisprudence and critical
race theory.' Defining these movements is almost as difficult a task as

* Professor, George Washington University School of Law. The author thanks Monroe
Freedman and Kevin Hopkins for helpful comments. Marc Guilford and Eduardo Rodriguez
provided fine research assistance.
I. See DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON: THE RADICAL
ASSAULT ON AMERICAN LAW 5 (1997) (describing radical multiculturalists as "adherents of a broad
assortment of theories, including critical race theory, radical feminism, and legal writings about
gays and lesbians"); Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Latcrit Theory: Some PreliminaryNotes Towards a
TransatlanticDialogue, 9 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 9 (2001) ("Critical Legal Studies
emerged as a loosely aligned and radically progressive network of scholars working in the
American legal academy in the latter half of the 1970s."). Some scholars have also described Law
and Economics jurisprudence as radical. See, e.g., Thomas C. Heller, Structuralism and Critique,36
STAN. L. REV. 127, 187 n.100 (1984) (describing Law and Economics as both radical and
conservative); Charles K. Rowley, Wealth Maximization in Normative Law and Economics: A
Social Choice Analysis, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 971, 995 (1998) (noting that Law and Economics is
driven by a conservative group of scholars supporting a "very radical principle"); Edward L. Rubin,
The Practice and Discourse of Legal Scholarship, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1835, 1862 (1988) (explaining
that Law and Economics and Critical Legal studies both urge a radical transformation of the judicial
decision-making process). See also Cedric Merlin Powell, Hopwood: Bakke II and Skeptical
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defining radicalism generally (or "liberalism" or "conservativism"). 2 In
fact, one of the objectives of the critical theory project has been to
articulate how it differs from ordinary liberal politics. For the purposes
of this article it may be more helpful to articulate some positions that a
radical might hold, and then to analyze whether these positions might
interfere with her duties as a judge.3
Duncan Kennedy, a prominent critical legal theorist, has described
a "set of intentions" that a judge might have in deciding a case. We can
think of Kennedy's listing as a kind of mission statement for the radical
judge. Writing in the persona of the judge, Kennedy says:
I see myself as a political activist, someone with the "vocation of
social transformation," as Roberto Unger put it. I see the set of rules in
force as chosen by the people who had the power to make the choices
in accord with their views on morality and justice and their own selfinterest. And I see the rules as remaining in force because victimized
groups have not had the political vision and energy and raw power to
change them. I see myself as a focus of political energy for change in
an egalitarian,
communitarian, decentralized democratic socialist
4
direction.
Generally speaking, legal radicals do not believe in the rule of law.
They assert that the law is politics, and that judges use their personal
values to decide cases. They think that the law is indeterminate-at least
in hard cases. They are instrumentalists. 5

Scrutiny, 9 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 811, 821 n.41 (1999) (describing the jurisprudence of Justices
Rehnquist, Scalia and Thomas as radical conservative).
2. See Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational
Character,Critical Realism, Power Economics and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 129, 182
(2003) (noting that critical legal theory, critical race theory and feminist jurisprudence can be
described as having "serious reservations about how 'knowable' our world is, about the existence of
truly neutral, apolitical social sciences and legal doctrines, and about the independence of judges,
scholars, and other reputedly neutral actors and institutions from the influence of existing
allocations of power").
3. Not every radical will subscribe to each of these beliefs.
4. See Duncan Kennedy, Imagining a Judge's Reasoning Process, in ANALYTIC
JURISPRUDENCE ANTHOLOGY 204 (Anthony D'Amato ed., 1996).
5. See generally MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987); ROBERTO
M. UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT (1986); ROBERTO M. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE
& POLITICS 89-92, 97-98 (1976) (explaining that judges who issue instrumentalist opinions rely on
firmly established personal values in the guise of legal reasoning to render their decisions); Peter
Gabel & Duncan Kennedy, Roll Over Beethoven, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984) (panel discussion from
symposium on critical legal studies). Mark Tushnet and Joseph Singer maintain that legal rules
never produce determinate results in real cases. See MARK V. TUSHNET, RED WHITE, AND BLUE: A
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There are judges who seem to adhere to weak, watered down
versions of critical theory. These judges are more "liberal" than radical.
Justices Thurgood Marshall and Ruth Bader Ginsburg are examples of
this kind of judge.6 Although the suggestion that liberal judges should be
disqualified by virtue of their politics (or other aspects of their identity)
is not unknown, 7 I want to consider the more difficult case-whether
people who are to the left of liberal should aspire to the bench and, if
they do, whether there is any ethical reason to prevent them 'from
attaining it.
II.

WHY WOULD A RADICAL WANT TO BE A JUDGE?

Judges, in the traditional view, interpret law. Radicals don't buy8
this, at least not in the formal or pragmatic meaning of interpretation.
They think that judges actually make law, because the indeterminacy of
CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 191-92 (1988); Joseph William Singer, ThA/layer

t,.
and the Cards. Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1,11-12 (1984).
6. See, e.g., Philippa Strum, Change and Continuity on the Supreme Court: Conv'fsations
with Justice Blackmun, 34 U. RICH. L. REV. 285, 287-88 (2000) ("Blackmun pointed tIJustice
Thurgood Marshall as an example of a Justice who was usually characterized as a 'liberal' "nd who
participated in many decisions that might well be typified as such, but whom Blackmun described
as 'basically conservative.' By that he meant that Marshall preferred to 'work within the system'
when it was at all possible-a preference with which Blackmun was in full sympathy, although he
recognized that it was not one held by all the Justices."); Deborah Jones Merritt & David M.
Lieberman, Ruth Bader Ginsburg's Jurisprudence of Opportunity and Equality, 104 COLUM. L.
REV. 39, 48 (2004) ("Ruth Bader Ginsburg has always eschewed labels of 'conservative' or 'liberal'
for herself and other judges .... [S]he is both a conservative-someone who maintains our oldest
ideals-and a liberal-one who beckons us to new worlds.").
7. See, e.g., MacDraw, Inc. v. CIT Group Equip. Fin., Inc., 138 F.3d 33, 38 (2d Cir. 1998)
(upholding sanctions imposed by trial judge against attorneys who suggested that the judge recuse
himself based upon his status as an Asian-American and Clinton administration appointee); see also
In re Mason, 916 F.2d 384, 386 (7th Cir. 1990) (denying a writ of mandamus to disqualify a judge
because he made pre-appointment contributions of $100 to each of the defendants). A judge's
former political affiliation does not create an appearance of impartiality. See United States v.
Alabama, 828 F.2d 1532, 1543 (11th Cir. 1987) (refusing to disqualify a judge, who had acted as
plaintiffs' counsel in a civil rights suit in the past, from presiding over an action to desegregate
Alabama universities). "The fact that a trial judge harbors political views, religious persuasion or
values that are in direct opposition to those of the defendant does not, standing alone, constitute a
basis for recusal." Welsh v. Commonwealth, 416 S.E.2d 451, 461 (Va. Ct. Npp. 1992).
8. A pragmatist judge would be "practical, instrumental, forward-looking, activist, empirical,
skeptical, antidogmatic, experimental." RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 11 (1995). A
judge does not have an "obligation to maintain a 'fit' between what he does and what his
predecessors did." Id. A formalist, on the other hand, would try to follow rules previously set out by
legislation or common law and allow these rules to decide as much of the case as possible. See
Laura E. Little, Hairsplitting and Complexity in Conflict of Laws: The Paradox of Formaliim, 37
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 925, 966-67 (2004). The result is that, in a given case, the judge ends up
actually deciding a very small point of law.
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law makes any kind of "objective" interpretation impossible. One might
imagine, then, that in the radical view judges have a lot of power. In a
way, yes, but in another way, no. Many radicals are dubious about the
ability of the law to improve the plight of subordinated people. 9 They
believe that "all systems of law are constructed to protect the state and
its economic base. Conduct that seriously threatens the survival of the
state or that would effectuate a basic change in its economic system is,
ipso facto, 'illegal."" 0 From this perspective, judges make law, so they
are as powerful as the law, which is to say, not very powerful as far as
remedying economic or social oppression is concerned. 1
An important inquiry, then, is why would a radical want to be a
judge? She believes that American society requires fundamental
transformation, but she doubts that the law can do this. In her view, the
law is an opiate, or worse, a tool of capitalist oppression.' 2 Our potential
judge, however, is a lawyer. This means that already she has lowered
expectations about her role in the radical project. She has decided
against taking it to the streets. Instead she is working within, or through,
or around the law.
Thus, the radical contemplating the bench compares the good that
she could do there with the good that she is doing as a lawyer. The
average judge might have more power than the average lawyer, even if
neither can change society. In the radical view, a judge has the same
kind of potential to help the oppressed as a supervisor in a social
worker's office. Our potential jurist could reason that it is better to be the
boss than to be an employee. As a judge, she can mediate disputes, and
pressure parties into settlements that seem fair. She can make
incremental changes in the law. She cannot reallocate wealth on a grand
scale, but perhaps she can shift here and there.
Of course, the judge can only adjudicate the cases before her. In
many, perhaps most of the cases on her docket, she would not have the

9. See Derrick Bell, Racial Realism, 24 CONN. L. REV. 363, 377-78 (1992); Kimberld
Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in

AntidiscriminationLaw,101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1350 (1988).
10. Victor Rabinowitz, The Radical Tradition in the Law, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A
PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 427 (David Kairys ed., rev. ed., 1990) (emphasis in original).
11.

But see id.

12. Some radicals have expressed slightly more hopeful views about the law. Kimberld
Crenshaw, for example, has argued that the law can help relieve symbolic subordination, as opposed
to material subordination. See Crenshaw, supra note 9; see also Rabinowitz, supra note 10;
PATRICIA WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS: DIARY OF A LAW PROFESSOR 148-65
(1991).
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opportunity to do her radical work. The law is not an especially helpful
mechanism for re-allocating wealth between haves and have-nots. Poor
people do not seem to have high expectations of it. 13 If most of what the
judge would do would be to re-shuffle money from one privileged party
to another, she could reasonably decide that she could help more poor
people as a lawyer/advocate than as a judge.
The poor, however, dominate criminal court.' 4 If the judge hears
criminal cases, she can try to affect the outcome of individual cases in a
way that she thinks is just. She can, for example, dismiss cases, or
mitigate punishment, when racial profiling seems responsible for the
initial police attention to the defendant.15 In bench trials, she can nullify
in cases in which she believes prosecutors have misused their discretion.
In deciding motions to suppress evidence, she can subject the6 testimony
of police officers to the same standards as any other witness.'

13. See ALBERT H. CANTRIL, ABA, AGENDA FOR ACCESS: THE AMERICAN PEOPLE & CIVIL
JUSTICE (1996) (summarizing the findings of the Comprehensive Legal Needs Study and
concluding that "[elach year about half of all low- and moderate-income households in the United
States face a serious situation that raises a civil legal issue. But neither low-income nor moderateincome households bring the overwhelming proportion of such situations to any part of the justice
system"), at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/delivery/delunbundbook.htm;
Mark Lloyd, The
Digital Divide and Equal Access to Justice, 24 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 505, 508-09 (2002)
(reporting results of an ABA study that "found that each year about half of poor and moderateincome households face a serious legal situation, but only about one-third of this half bring their
problem to either an attorney or to court").
14. See STEVEN K. SMITH & CAROL J. DEFRANCES, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, INDIGENT
DEFENSE 4 tbl.8 (1996) (reporting that in 1992, fifty-nine percent of felony defendants in the
nation's seventy-five largest counties had a public defender and twenty-two percent had courtappointed counsel), at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/id.pdf; JEFFREY H. REIMAN, THE RICH
GET RICHER AND THE POOR GET PRISON: IDEOLOGY, CLASS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 48-49 (citing
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE: UNIFORM CRIME REPS. FOR THE U.S.: 1993, at 216, 227-28, 234-35 (1994)
(noting that one of the typical characteristics of the inmate is that "he is poor: Among state prisoners
in 1991, thirty-three percent were unemployed prior to being arrested-a rate nearly four times that
of males in the general population. Among those state prisoners who had incomes prior to being
arrested, nineteen percent earned less than $3,000 a year (compared with 6.8 percent of males in the
civilian labor force), and half earned less than $10,000 a year (compared with twenty-five percent of
non-institutionalized males)"); see also Darryl K. Brown, Cost-Benefit Analysis in Criminal Law, 92
CAL. L. REV. 323, 359 (2004) ("Most criminal defendants are fairly poor, and the families and
communities to whom they are connected are poor as well."). Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining
Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2546 (2004) ("Criminal defendants are
disproportionately poor young men.").
15. See, e.g., United States v. Leviner, 31 F. Supp. 2d 23, 33 (D. Mass. 1998) (Gertner, J.)
(departing downward from the U.S. Sentencing Commission Guidelines where the African
American defendant's criminal record reflected a number of "countable" motor vehicle offenses,
and studies indicated disproportionate targeting of African Americans for such offenses).
16. Alan Dershowitz has said that "[m]ost trial judges pretend to believe police officers who
they know are lying." ALAN DERSHOWITZ, THE BEST DEFENSE xxii (1982).
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IS IT ETHICAL?

Can one ethically be a radical judge? The answer, obviously,
depends on whose ethical construct is being considered. For this
analysis, I will use the American Bar Association's Model Code of
Judicial Conduct. 17 1 selected this Code because it is both influential and
fairly representative of state judicial codes. The ABA Model Code sets
forth five canons:
Canon 1: A judge shall uphold the integrity and independence
of the judiciary.' 8

Canon 2: A judge shall avoid impropriety and the appearance
of impropriety in all of the judge's activities.' 9

Canon 3: A judge shall perform the duties of judicial office
impartially and diligently.20

17. "The American Bar Association's Codes of Judicial Conduct are the foundation for
judicial discipline and disqualification in American courts. Forty-nine of the states have adopted
some form of the American Bar Association ("ABA") Codes." Leslie W. Abramson, Appearance of
Impropriety: Deciding When a Judge's Impartiality "Might Reasonably Be Questioned," 14 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 55, 55 (2000).
18. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1 (1990). Canon I further provides that "[a]

judge should participate in establishing, maintaining and enforcing high standards of conduct, and
shall personally observe those standards so that the integrity and independence of the judiciary will
be preserved." Id.
19. Id. Canon 2. Canon 2A provides that "[a] judge shall respect and comply with the
law .. ." See id. Canon 2A. "Impropriety" for purposes of Canon 2 will include violations of the
law, court rules, or the Model Code of Judicial Conduct. Id. cmt. 2.
20. Id. Canon 3. Canon 3A provides that the judicial activities of a judge take priority over all
of her other activities. See id. Canon 3A. The Canon defines judicial duties to include "all the duties
of the judge's office prescribed by law." Id; see also id. Terminology (defining "law" to include
court rules, statutes, constitutional provisions and court decisions). Canon 3B(2) provides that a
judge "shall be faithful to the law and ... shall not be swayed by partisan interests, public clamor or
fear of criticism." See id. Canon 3B(2). Finally, Canon 3B(5) provides that "[a] judge shall perform
judicial duties without bias or prejudice based upon race, sex, religion, national origin, disability...
or socioeconomic status ... " See id. Canon 3B(5).
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Canon 4: A judge shall so conduct the judge's extra-judicial
activities as to minimize the risk of conflict with judicial
obligations."

Canon 5: A judge or judicial candidate shall refrain from
inappropriate political activity.2 2

Probably Canons 2 and 3 most worry the radical judge. Canon 1 is
too vague to provide a cause of action for anyone inclined to depose her.
Canon 4 might require a judge to resign her membership in radical
organizations, but it would apply also to judges who are members of the
National Rifle Association or the American Civil Liberties Union. Our
inquiry is whether any ethical considerations would have a different
impact on radical judges than on judges of other political persuasions.
Canon 5 initially sounds prohibitive to the radical judge, but its
subsections and commentary reveal that it is concerned with politics in a
formal sense. It forbids judges from leading political organizations or
making campaign contributions. 23 Here, again, the radical judge would
be no more constrained than the Democrat or Republican one.
Canons 2 and 3 use words like "impropriety" and "impartially" that
initially seem too general to restrict a radical from becoming a judge.
Each canon, however, contains subsections that offer more limiting
interpretations. Together these sections can be read as discouraging to
radicals who seek the bench.
Canon 2A, for example, states "a judge shall respect and comply
with the law. . .

."

Canon 3B(2) requires that "a judge shall be faithful to

the law." Canon 3B(5) states that "a judge shall perform judicial duties
without bias or prejudice" including "prejudice ... based upon
socioeconomic status." Canon 3E(1) requires that a judge disqualify

21.

Id. Canon 4 (regulating or prohibiting extra-judicial participation in certain financial and

business dealings, government and civic organizations, and the practice of law).
22. Id. Canon 5A(l)(a)-(e). Canon 5A(l)(a)-(e) provides that a judge or candidate for judicial

office refrain from: (1) acting as a leader or holding an office in a political organization; (2) publicly
endorsing or opposing another candidate for public office; (3) making speeches on behalf of a
political organization; (4) attending political gatherings; or (5) soliciting funds for, paying an

assessment or making a contribution to a political organization or candidate, or purchasing tickets
for political party fundraisers and events. Id.
23.

See id. at Canon 5(A)(1)(a), (e).
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herself in a proceeding in which her "impartiality might reasonably be
questioned."
Faithful adherence to these standards would require the ABA to
oppose an openly radical judicial candidate. To the ABA, radical is
unethical, even if the equation is not necessarily intuitive.
Perhaps this is only fair. The radical, after all, does not respect the
law, and she is not particularly inclined to be faithful to it. When the law
appears to go against how she thinks a case should come out, she will go
with her own view.24 She is biased against the rich and in favor of the
poor. In a hypothetical case involving a dispute between a powerful
person, say Bill Gates, and a less powerful person, say Bill Gates's
cleaning lady, the radical would not be impartial. She would hope that
25
Bill Gates's cleaning lady prevails.
To the radical, however, the ABA's special attention to her
propriety and bias may seem unfair. She believes that other judges are
just as political and just as outcome determinative: they are either too
ignorant to realize it, or they disguise it, i.e., they lie about it. She
wonders if she is being penalized for being honest.
Indeed the radical judge is not necessarily opposed to ethical
guidelines. She might even consider her radical work, including on the
bench, bound by some ethical restrictions, even if her own
considerations do not substantially overlap with those of the American
Bar Association. It is, after all, probably some personalized construct of
morality that inspired her radicalism in the first place.
Duncan Kennedy, for example, writes that as a judge, he would
observe the following strictures, which blend moral and consequentialist
concerns:
First, I see myself as having promised some diffuse public
that I will "decide according to law," and it is clear to me that a
minimum meaning of this pledge is that I won't do things for
which I don't have a good legal argument....

24. There is some tension between the radical idea that the rule of law is indeterminate and
the idea of the law "appearing to go against" how a judge thinks a case should come out. Some
radicals have tried to resolve this tension by claiming that the rule of law is indeterminate only in
hard cases, and that in easy cases there may be a "correct" legal answer.
25. It is legitimate to ask how far the judge would go in advancing the cleaning lady's cause.
There probably is some line that she would not cross.
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Second, various people in my community will sanction me
severely if I do not offer a good legal argument for my
action....
Third, I want my position to stick....
Fourth, by engaging in legal argument I can shape the
outcomes of future cases and influence popular consciousness
about what kinds of action are legitimate....
Fifth, every case is part of my life-project of being a liberal
activist judge. What I do in this case will affect my ability to do
things in other cases, enhancing or diminishing my legal and
political credibility as well as my technical reputation with the
various constituencies that will notice....
Sixth, since I see legal argument as a branch of ethical
argument, I would like to know for my own purposes how26my
position looks translated into this particular ethical medium.
It probably does not come as a surprise that the American Bar
Association prefers its judges non-radical, as opposed to radical. It is
noteworthy, however, that the ABA construct of judicial ethics penalizes
radical judges for their politics in a way that liberal and conservative
judges are not penalized. This kind of viewpoint discrimination recalls
the debate in the 1980s about whether radical scholars should teach in
law schools, since they purported not to believe in the rule of law.27
In the academy, this controversy was apparently resolved in favor
of the radicals, since people with radical politics continue to teach, and
to receive tenure. 28 In the judiciary, the more likely result is that radical
judges will go underground. They will not be open about the extent of
their dissatisfaction with the status quo. They will proceed stealthily.

26. Kennedy, supra note 4, at 208-09.
27. See Paul D. Carrington, Of Law and River, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 222, 227 (1984).
28. See Timothy W. Floyd, Legal Education and the Vision Thing, 31 GA. L. REV. 853, 866
(1997) ("This evolution in legal scholarship has not been without controversy. Just as the Legal
Realists faced opposition from those wedded to the notion of legal science, so too postmodernist
legal narratives have been subjected to attack and vilification. At the moment, the ultimate outcome
of the conflict has not yet been determined. Although a perusal of a recent issue of the Current
Index to Legal Periodicals immediately demonstrates that "outsider" scholarship is becoming
increasingly mainstream, some prominent academics and jurists openly call for a counterrevolution.").
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THE RADICAL JUDGE AT WORK

There are no self-avowed radical judges. Professor Peter Schank
describes a critical legal theory judge as "that most unlikely creature of
our imaginations. ' ' 29 In trying to imagine a "[c]rit judge," Judge Judith
Kaye, of the New York Court 30of Appeals, also has wondered "if.
there could be such a creature."
There are, however, radical legal scholars. What if someone like
Derrick Bell, Richard Delgaldo, Duncan Kennedy, or Catharine
MacKinnon were appointed to the bench? Would their politics change
their view of their work as judges, or would their work as judges change
their politics? Mainstream academics mainly suggest the latter. Professor
Suzanna Sherry claims that it is "no surprise" that "judges who express
radical views in their scholarship often do not implement those views in
their judicial decisions. 3 1 Professor Peter Schanck suggests that
[T]he CLS judge, would be more inclined in actual practice to use the
time-honored methods of interpretation than deconstruction, so as to
retain credibility and avoid reversal on appeal or professional sanction.

Even were the judge steadfastly to refuse to consider personal concerns
about his or her professional status, the pull of the conventional
approaches, resulting from the judge's socialization by and
32 immersion
in our legal system, might nevertheless prove irresistible.

From critical legal theorists, we have examples of radical judging,
at least in a theoretical sense. In a seminal article, Duncan Kennedy
imagined that he was a trial judge resolving a labor dispute.33 Likewise,
Professors Derrick Bell and Catharine MacKinnon, in the guise of
Supreme Court justices in 1954, wrote opinions for Brown v. Board of
Education.34 In analyzing these opinions, the scholarly skepticism about
critical judging seems warranted: but for the fact that the play-judges are
slightly

more transparent

about their politics, their opinions are

29. Peter C. Schank, UnderstandingPostmodern Thought and Its Implicationsfor Statutory
Interpretation,65 S.CAL. L. REV. 2505, 2587-88 (1991).
30. John E. Murray, Jr., Contract Theories and the Rise of Neoformalism, 71 FORDHAM L.
REV. 869, 875 n.31 (2002) (quoting Judith S. Kaye, Commentary by Judith S.Kaye, 1988 ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 265, 266 (1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
31. Suzanna Sherry, Judges of Character,38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 793, 800 n.37 (2003).
32. Schanck, supra note 29, at 2587-88 (footnote omitted).
33. See generally Kennedy, supra note 4 (describing the legal reasoning that the author would
employ to resolve a labor dispute if he were a judge).
34. See Derrick Bell, in WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID 185-200
(Jack M. Balkin ed., 2001); Catharine A. MacKinnon, in WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION
SHOULD HAVE SAID, supra, 143-57.
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indistinguishable from other judges, especially traditionally liberal
judges. Perhaps what this reveals is that the law is an inherently
moderating or conservative influence-as soon as one puts on a robe,
she loses her radical aspirations.35 On the other hand, it might be
evidence that there are radical judges out there, but that they present as
liberals.
Duncan Kennedy, as a judge, is assigned a case that presents a
conflict between "the law" and "how-I-want-to-come-out." Kennedy
posits five possibilities, without choosing one. He can 1) "[g]o along
with the law; 2) "[w]ithdraw from the case; 3) decide based on his view
of what the law should be; 4) decide "on the basis of an implausible
legal argument"; or 5) decide against the injunction "on the basis of fact
findings that [he] knows to be false." 36 Kennedy suggests any of these
choices could be appropriate in a given case and that "[w]hether [judges]
should always follow the law in cases of conflict is a question that we
answer as best we can through reflection and argument about our
political system, about the actual laws in force within that system, and
about particular cases. 37 Kennedy's ambition is limited; he describes
himself, if successful, as shifting the "mantle of legal legitimacy.., a
little. 38
39
In their hypothetical opinions for Brown v. Board of Education,
radical legal scholars Catharine MacKinnon and Derrick Bell
respectively concur with and dissent from a majority opinion that
overturns Plessy v. Ferguson.40 MacKinnon's concurrence declares that
because the purpose of the segregation ordinance at issue is to maintain
white supremacy, the ordinance offends equal protection; her rationale
not only looks traditional, it looks old-fashioned. It is reminiscent of
Justice Harlan's reasoning in 1896 in his famous Plessy dissent, which
1
MacKinnon cites as "vindicated today.A

35.
36.
37.
38.

See Kennedy, supra note 4, at 216.
Id. at 216-17.
Id. at 217.
Id.at 206.

39.

See WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID, supra note 34, at 143-

57, 185-200.
40. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
41.

MacKinnon, in WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID, supra note

34 at 147. See also Jordan Steiker, American Icon: Does It Matter What the Court Said in Brown?,
81 TEX. L. REV. 305, 313 (2002) (reviewing What Brown v. Board of Education Should Have Said)

("Like Justice Harlan, [MacKinnon] explicitly connects segregation to the ideology of white
supremacy.").
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Bell's opinion is more explicitly political: he writes that white
people will not allow the majority opinion to be enforced, and that black
students would therefore be better off in segregated schools that actually
have resources equal to white schools.4 2 Bell's analysis reads less like a
judicial opinion than MacKinnon's. Professor Jordan Steiker notes that
"Those who criticize Brown as insufficiently 'law-like' would probably
find fault in Bell's effort .... Nothing in Bell's opinion is particularly
responsive to the Brown litigation itself ...His opinion is an essay on
American racism, and Bell makes little
effort to dress his insights in the
43
language or style of Court opinions.
Bell, however, like MacKinnon, makes arguments that suggest that
his interpretation of the law (in this case the United States Constitution)
is "correct." 44 Both radical scholars engage legal doctrine and hinge their
outcomes on the law, as opposed to their own politics. In this sense, their
opinions look like any other judicial opinions. They do not seem
especially radical in form or content.
We might expect a radical judge to use more tools of
deconstruction, including "trashing" the process, by, for example, giving
short shrift to the illusory power of "argument" to decide a case.45 An
openly radical judge might be transparent about the fact that it is "pure
politics" and not "legal analysis" that guides her vote.46 Yet the
socialization of the legal system, even the socialization of radical
scholars in hypothetical cases, appears to be very powerful-it even
constrains radical scholars in hypothetical cases. Thus the
radical judge
'47
imaginations.
our
of
creature
unlikely
most
"the
remains

42.

See Bell, in WHAT BROWN V.BOARD OFEDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID, supra note 34, at

196-99.
43. Id.at 319.
44. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 522 (1980).
45. See Mark G. Kelman, Trashing, 36 STAN. L. REV. 293, 293 (1984) ("Here's one account
of the technique that we in Critical Legal Studies often use in analyzing legal texts, a technique I
call "Trashing": Take specific arguments very seriously in their own terms; discover they are
actuallyfoolish ([tragi]-comic); and then look for some external observer's order (not the germ of
truth) in the internally contradictory, incoherent chaos we've exposed.").
46. See, e.g., Paul Butler et al., The Case of the Speluncean Explorers: Revisite: Justice
Stupidest Housemaid, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1917, 1920 (1999) (writing as "Justice Stupidest
Housemaid" to portray a radical judge who uses "pure politics" to decide a case). See also
Girardeau A. Spann, PurePolitics,88 MICH. L. REV. 1971, 1993-94 (1990).
47. See Peter Schanek, supra note 29, at 2587.
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